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STUDENT NOTES
BusNESS REcoIDS AS EVIDENCE IN WEST VIRGINIA
"Hearsay evidence is testimony in court or written evidence,
of a statement made out of court, such statement being offered
as an assertion to show the truth of matters asserted therein, and
thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court

asserter."' As a general rule, hearsay evidence is inadmissible.2
There are many exceptions to the hearsay rule,8 one of which is
broadly termed the "regular entries" exception. 4 This exception has
two branches: (1) the so-called "shopbook" rule, which deals with
entries by a litigant in his own books, and (2) the so-called "regu-

lar entries" rule, which originally dealt only with entries made by
one not a party to the suit, but now also deals with entries made by
a litigant.5 There is now no justification for the existence of two
1
McComwcm, HANDBOOK OF THE LA.W OF EVIDENCE § 225, at 460 (1950)
(emphasis
added).
2
Rohrbaugh v. Rohrbaugh, 186 W. Va. 708, 68 S.E.2d 861 (1951);
Wade v. Haught, 112 W. Va. 469, 164 S.E. 662 (1982); Charlton v. Pancake,
98 W. Va. 863, 127 S.E. 70 (1925). Thayer theorizes that the hearsay rule is
but an exception to the rule that "whatsoever is relevant is admissible". THAYER,
A PrELIMINARY ThEATIsE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAw 522 (1898).

3 The Uniform Rules of Evidence list thirty-one exceptions.
4 5 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 1517 (3d ed. 1940).
5
Norville, The Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, 27 ORE. L. REV.
188, 189 (1948).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1958

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 4 [1958], Art. 5

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
separate branches of this exception. 6 In West Virginia there is no
clear line of distinction made between the two branches. 7 The application of the broadly termed "regular entries" exception has been
burdened with many technicalities, some of them hair-splitting. 8
The historical development of the "regular entries" exception
to the hearsay rule will not be traced herein.9 Not all of the technicalities which have cropped up in the various jurisdictions will be
considered. No attempt will be made to draw fine distinctions between the two branches of this exception. The scope of this note
will be, rather, a discussion of the existing West Virginia law
pertaining to the admissibility in evidence of business records, a
discussion of the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act,' 0 and,
finally, a discussion of the desirability of adopting the Uniform
Business Records as Evidence Act in West Virginia.
The early West Virginia case of Vinal v. Gilman." set forth the
following requirements for the admissibility of book entries into
evidence: (1) the book must be a book of original entries; (2) the
entry should be made when the transaction occurred; (3) the entry
must be made in the regular course of one's business, duty or
employment; (4) there must be personal knowledge of the trans2
actions on the part of the one making the entries.'
(A)

OmGiNAL ENnhIEs

EQuniEmmNT

In Deitz v. McVey' s the plaintiff, in an action of assumpsit on
account for lumber, kept tally slips as the lumber was loaded on
wagons; these slips were kept until a certain quantity was made
up, and then plaintiff's bookkeeper made the appropriate book
entries to ascertain the amount due; and then the tally slips were
destroyed. It was held that these book entries were original, and
hence were admissible.
6!d.at 192; 5 WiGmons, EVIDENCE § 1517. See also McCosmucx, op. cit.
supra note 1, § 282, at 598.
7 See 5 WIcMoRE, EVIDENCE § 1561 n.5.
8 See Norville, supra note 5, at 189-96.

For a comprehensive treatment of the "regular entries" exception to the
hearsay rule, see 5 WicMonE, EVIDENCE §§ 1517-61.
10 This act was adopted in 1936. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFRENCE OF CoMnISSIONES ON UNoRM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDIN GS 175

(1936).
1121 W. Va. 301 (1883).
12 Vinal v. Gilman, 21 W. Va. 301, 314-15 (1883).
1377 W. Va. 601, 87 S.E. 926 (1916).
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In at least one case, 14 an account book has been held inadmissible on the ground that it was not a book of original entries.
There, the first book had been destroyed by fire, and a later account
book had been made by the plaintiff from memory.
Other West Virginia cases emphasize that a book entry must
be an original one in order to be admissible. 15
It thus appears to be firmly established that in West Virginia
the entry must be an original one. However, in a given case it may
be difficult to predict whether or not the entries will be held to
be original. 16 It can be safely stated, though, that, if the contention
is made that certain entries are not original, the court will be compelled to consider the contention and ascertain whether the "original
entry" requirement is met.

(B)

AT

TMn

OF TSANsAC1ION REQuIBEMNT

A book entry made in 1892 concerning business transactions
in 1885 and 1886 is not admissible as a book entry made in due
8
course of business. 17 The original requirement in Vinal v. Gilman,1
that the entry should be made when the transaction occurred, is
altered in a later case: "the entry [must be] co-temporaneous,
or practically so, with the transaction."' 9 It is not necessary to make
the entries at the time of the transaction, as long as they are made
as promptly as it is convenient to do so, owing to the character of
the business. 20 And where book entries are made from tally sheets
it is not essential that the entries be made even shortly after the
transaction occurred. 2 '
The requirement now apparently is that the entry must be
made at or about the time of the transaction with the nature of
the particular business being taken into consideration in determining whether the requirement is sufficiently satisfied.
14 Martufi v. Daniels, 99 W. Va. 673, 129 S.E. 709 (1925).
15 See e.g., State v. Martin, 102 W. Va. 107, 112, 113, 134 S.E. 599, 601
(1926); State v. Larue, 98 W. Va. 677, 690, 691, 128 S.E. 116, 121 (1925);
Griffith v. American Coal Co., 75 W. Va. 686, 695, 84 S.E. 621, 625 (1915).
16Cf. Deitz v. McVey, 77 V. Va. 601, 87 S.E. 926 (1916); Martufi v.

Daniels, 99 W. Va. 673, 129 S.E. 709 (1925).
17 Rowan v. Chenoweth, 49 W. Va. 287, 292, 38 S.E. 544, 546 (1901)
(dictum).
18 21 W. Va. 301, 314 (1883).
19 West Virginia Architects and Builders v. Stewart, 68 W. Va. 506, 508, 70
S.E. 2113, 114 (1911) (emphasis added).
0Parkersburg & Marietta Sand Co. v. Smith, 76 W. Va. 246, 256, 85 S.E.
516, 21
520 (1915).
Deitz v. McVey, 77 W. Va. 601, 603, 87 S.E. 926, 927 (1916).
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(C)

REGULAR COURSE OF BUSINESS REQUIREMENT

No case has been found substantially testing the "regular course
of business" requirement. However, it can be definitely stated that
22
is essential, for it is so stated in most of the business records cases.
(D)

PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT AND PRODUCTION
OF WITNESSES REQUIREMENT

It was stated in an early case that there must be "personal
knowledge of the transactions on the part of the one making the
entry."2 3 In that case the entrant was not available as a witness,
being a nonresident; but his handwriting was proven, and it was
proven that he had actually taken part in the transaction which
was recorded. It was held that the "personal knowledge" test was
24
satisfied even though the entrant had not testified.

There is a series of cases which demonstrates a modem, liberal
attitude of the West Virginia court toward the technicalities and
restrictions governing the admissibility of business records. In order
to more fully understand and appreciate this attitude, it is necessary
to mention another common law restriction. Originally the one
making the entry, and any one furnishing information to the entrant,
had to be produced as a witness at the trial, or proven to be unavailable as a witness before the business records could be received
25
as evidence.

The "personal knowledge" requirement and the "production
of witnesses" requirement are being considered together as it is
difficult to separate the two.
In West Virginia Architects and Builders v. Stewart2 6 it was
contended that certain book entries were inadmissible as the entrant,
the plaintiff's bookkeeper, had no personal knowledge of the transaction recorded. Her entries were made from information given to
her by the president and a foreman of the plaintiff corporation. The
president's testimony was excluded on the ground that it related
to a transaction with a decedent. The foreman was not called as
22 See, e.g., State v. Martin, 102 W. Va. 107, 113, 184 S.E. 599, 601
(1926); West Virginia Arclitects and Builders v. Stewart, 68 W. Va. 506, 508,
70 S.E.
113, 114 (1911).
2
3Vinal v. Gilman, 21 W. Va. 801, 315 (1888).
24 Id. at 301.
2 McCocNUCK, op. cit. supra note 1, § 288, at 605.
26 68 W. Va. 506, 70 S.E. 118 (1911).
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a witness. The court held that the books were admissible, relying
27
heavily upon Professor Wigmore.
In a criminal case28 it was held that certain book entries of
an employer, which were verified by department supervisors, were
admissible without calling as witnesses either the employees having
personal knowledge of the transaction or the employees who made
the entries.
In a later criminal case,29 to establish an alibi, work records
of a repair shop, made out by mechanics, were admitted upon the
production and verification of the records by supervisors, without
calling as witnesses the mechanics who did the work and made
the entries.
These last three cases cut deeply into the "personal knowledge"
requirement, and also cut deeply into the "production of witnesses"
requirement. Two of the cases80 do not even require the presence
of the entrant as a witness. Not only is personal knowledge of the
entrant not always required, but his presence as a witness and the
presence as a witness of those having personal knowledge of the
transaction recorded are not required.
These West Virginia cases have been liberal, and justifiably
so, as records of business establishments are normally considered
reliable in the business world. Those having dealings with business
firms do not normally ask that the entrant or informant be produced
to explain the entries before reliance is placed on them. Surely then
the courts should likewise give credence to these records. Professor
Wigmore offers several reasons for dispensing with the "personal
knowledg&' requirement and the "production of witnesses" requirement: (1) employees may have left the services of the employer;
(2) it cannot always be ascertained who made the entries; (3)
the production in court of numerous employees would interrupt the
work of a business establishment; (4) the cost of the evidence may
be prohibitive; and (5) the memory of such persons usually affords
little aid.31
§ 1580, at 879.
8 State v. Larue, 98 W. Va. 677, 128 S.E. 116 (1925).
29 State v. Martin, 102 W. Va. 107, 184 S.E. 599 (1926).
3 Ibid.; State v. Larue, 98 W. Va. 677, 128 S.E. 116 (1925).
31 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1580, at 878.

27 5 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE
2
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Types of Business Records Admitted
Records of various types of business have been admitted in
West Virginia. Among them have been records of an oil company, 32
building contractor, 3 physician, 34 lumber manufacturer, 35 private
38
banker, 6 cement company,37 and a garage.
It can not be definitely stated, however, just what types of
business or endeavor will be included in the "regular entries" exception to the hearsay rule. A good illustration of this is the uncertainty which exists as to hospital records. There is some doubt
whether hospital records will be admissible under the "regular
entries" exception to the hearsay rule. In Cline v. Evans,3 9 while
holding the records involved inadmissible for other reasons, the
court stated, "if properly identified, and shown to have been made
up in the regular course of treatment, it may be plausibly argued
that by analogy to rules governing the keeping of books and records,
the same [a hospital record] may, when properly identified and
within proper limits, be admissible as to routine matters, although
41
there is little authority to support such a rule."40 In a recent case,
the court in discussing the admissibility of entries in hospital records
does not lay down any rule, but suggests that "routine entries, and
perhaps ordinary diagnostic findings, based upon objective data,
and not presenting a42 question of obvious difficult interpretation,
should be admitted."
The Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act
Throughout the United States the application of the "regular
entries" exception had developed "a mass of detailed petty limitations that have no relation to the practical trustworthiness of the
documents offered"; 43 this resulted in "a mass of technicalities which
serve no useful purpose in getting at the truth."4 4 Remedial legis32

Vinal v. Gilman, 21 W. Va. 301 (1883).
33 Parkersburg & Marietta Sand Co. v. Smith, 76 W. Va. 246, 85 S.E.
516 (1915); West Virginia Architects and Builders v. Stewart, 68 W. Va. 506,

70 S.E. 113 (1911).

34 Grifflth v. American Coal Co., 75 W. Va. 686, 84 S.E. 621 (1915).

35 Deitz v. McVey, 77 W. Va. 601, 87 S.E. 926 (1916).
36
DiBacco v. Benedetto, 82 W. Va. 84, 95 S.E. 601 (1918).
37
State v. Larue, 98 W. Va. 677, 128 S.E. 116 (1925).
38
State v. Martin, 102 W. Va. 107, 134 S.E. 599 (1926).
39
40 127 W. Va. 113, 31 S.E.2d 681 (1944).
Cline v. Evans, 127 W. Va. 113, 120, 31 S.E.2d 681, 684 (1944).
41
Keller v. Worm, 140 W. Va. 860, 87 S.E.2d 453 (1955).
42 Id. at 872, 87 S.E.2d at 460.
43 5 WriGmro, EvmENcE § 1520, at 361.
44 Ibid.
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lation was needed. In 1927 a model act was published by a committee of the Commonwealth Fund of New York. 45 This act was the
model for the Federal Business Records Act4 6 and for statutes in
several states.47 Another remedial act, The Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act (sometimes hereinafter called the uniform
act), was adopted in 1986 by the Commissioners on Uniform State
8
Laws.4
This act provides:
"§ 1. Definition.-The term 'business' shall include every
kind of business, profession, occupation, calling or operation
of institutions, whether carried on for profit or not.
"§ 2. Business Records.-A record of an act, condition or
event, shall, in so far as relevant, be competent evidence if
the custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity
and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the
course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition or
event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of information, method and time of preparation were such as to justify
its admission.
"§ 3. Uniformity of Interpretation.-This act shall be so
interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose
to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
"§ 4. Short Tide.-This act may be cited as the Uniform
Business Records as Evidence Act.
"§ 5. Repeal.-All acts or parts of acts which are inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed.
45 "Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book or
otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence
or event shall be admissible in evidence in proof of said act, transaction, occurrence or event, if the trial judge shall find that it was made in the regular course
of any business, and that it was the regular course of such business to make
such memorandum or record at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence or
event or within a reasonable time thereafter. All other circumstances of the
making of such writing or record, including lack of personal knowledge by the
entrant or maker may be shown to affect its weight, but they shall not affect its
admissibility. The term business shall include business, profession, occupation
and calling of every kind."
40 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1952).
47 McComcK, op. cit. supra note 1, § 289 n.7. The states listed therein
are Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New Mexico,
New York and Rhode Island.
48 HANBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF Co¢nLNUssroI-Eas ON UNI-

Fom STATE I.Aws AND PnocErDjNs 175 (1936).
the states voting in favor of adoption. Ibid.

West Virginia was one of
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"§ 6. Time of Taking Effect.-This act shall take effect
"49

This act has met with wide approval.50
It is generally thought that the basic motivation for remedial
legislation was the burdensome requirement of producing as a witness the entrant and all who had personal knowledge of the facts
recorded, or showing justifiable unavailability. 5 1 It has been shown
previously that the West Virginia court has greatly relaxed this
requirement, and has adopted a liberal attitude toward this restriction.52 However, this was not the only weakness, or unduly technical requirement which was meant to be changed by the uniform
act. A comparison should then be made between the existing West
Virginia law and the uniform act to ascertain whether any change
in the former would be effected by adopting the latter, and to ascertain whether the change, if any, would be desirable.
It has been shown that one of the West Virginia requirements
is that the entry be an original one.5 3 No mention is made in the
uniform act that the entry must be original. This is one aspect of
the West Virginia law which would be changed by the uniform act.
This would surely be an improvement. The court should not be
concerned with whether or not an entry is original; it should instead be primarily concerned with the reliability and trustworthiness
of the record offered.
Another West Virginia requirement is that the entry be made
at or near the time of the transaction recorded. 54 The uniform act
contains a very similar requirement: "at or near the time of the
act, condition or event."55 Here, no change would result.
Also the "regular course of business" requirement appears in
57
the uniform act 56 as well as in the West Virginia cases.
49

9A UNIFORm LAws ANN. 299, 313 (1957).
5o The following are listed as having adopted the act. Arizona, California,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas Vermont, Washington and Wyoming. 9A UNI-FORm LAws AN. 297 (1957.
51 McCoiacK, op. cit. supra note 1, § 289, at 607; Norville, supra note 5,
at 195 n.45.
52 See notes 24-26, 28, 29 supra.
53 See notes 18-15 supra.

See notes 17-21 supra.
55 Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act § 2.
54

56 Ibid.

57 See note 22 supra.
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The "personal knowledge" and "production of witnesses" requirements nowhere appear in the uniform act, and as stated here-

tofore, the West Virginia cases have greatly relaxed these requirements. 58 Thus, no appreciable change in the law would be effected

here.
The uniform act provides that, "The term 'business' shall include every kind of business, profession, occupation, calling or
operationof institutions,whether carried on for profit or not."59 This

language makes it clear that hospital records are included. Indeed,
it has been so held.60 It is, at best, doubtful at the present time
whether hospital records are admissible in West Virginia as an
exception to the hearsay rule.61 Hence, the West Virginia law
would be clarified by adopting the act, at least to the extent that
hospital records would come within the purview of the statutory
"regular entries' exception, and would not be inadmissible on the
sole ground that they are not business records of the type contemplated to be admissible. 62 This would seem to be a desirable clarification. The fact that the record is not one of a business concern
should not affect its admissibility. The test should be whether or
not the particular record is reliable and trustworthy.
Another observation to be made is that, although the West
Virginia cases have relaxed the "personal knowledge" and "production of witnesses" requirements, still the records were produced
and verified by supervisors in whose department and under whose
supervision the records were kept.63 A situation could arise where
the supervisor, as well as all entrants and persons having knowledge
of the transactions recorded, would be unavailable as a witness.
Whether the West Virginia court would permit another employee
to verify the records is a matter of conjecture. But the uniform act
would allow the custodian or other qualified witness to testify to
the identity of the record and to the mode of its preparation. 64 This
approach, likewise, seems desirable.
58 See notes 24-26, 28, 29 supra.
59 Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act § 1 (emphasis added).
60 Brown v. Saint Paul City Ry., 241 Minn. 15, 62 N.W.2d 688 (1954);
Gallagher v. Portland Traction Co., 181 Ore. 385, 182 P.2d 354 (1947).
61 See notes 39-42 supra.
For an excellent discussion concerning contents of hospital records that
are properly admissible under the uniform act, see Norville, supra note 5,
199-212.
63 See State v. Martin, 102 W. Va. 107, 134 S.E. 599 (1926); State v.
Lame,
6 4 98 W. Va. 677, 128 S.E. 116 (1925).
Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act § 2.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1958

9

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 4 [1958], Art. 5
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

It should be emphasized that the uniform act bestows upon the
trial court a wide discretion. The act enumerates certain conditions
of admissibility and then goes on to say, "and, if in the opinion of
the court, the sources of information, method, and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission."65 Hence, the basic approach in the uniform act appears to be, not a reliance on technical,
inflexible requirements, but rather an overall evaluation of all pertinent circumstances in order to determine whether the particular
entry or record is sufficiently trustworthy to be admitted into
evidence.
The West Virginia law and the Uniform Business Records as
Evidence Act have been discussed and compared. It appears that
the West Virginia court has been a forward looking court in relaxing
the most cumbersome features of the "regular entries" exception,
that of requiring personal knowledge on the part of the entrant and
that of producing as witnesses all those who had personal knowledge of the transaction recorded.
However, there apparently still exists in West Virginia the
notion that an entry must be an original one in order to be admissible. It is also conjectural as to just what types of endeavor will be
covered by the West Virginia rule. As a specific illustration, it has
been shown that it is doubtful whether hospital records will be admissible. Also, in the absence of the entrant, those having knowledge of the transaction recorded, and the supervisor under whose
supervision the record was kept, it is not clear whether any one else
could verify the record. It should also be kept in mind that other
restrictions imposed in other jurisdictions may somehow find their
way into our law.
Under the uniform act there is no "original entry" requirement;
hospital records are clearly admissible; and the record may be
verified by the custodian or other qualified witness. Moreover, the
whole tenor of the uniform act is to liberalize and modernize the
law governing the admissibility of business records into evidence.
In order to discard any restrictive remnants of the common
law pertaining to business records as evidence which may still be
present in West Virginia, to keep other restrictions from filtering
into our law from other jurisdictions, and to maintain and continue
a modern, forward looking attitude toward the admissibility of busi65 Ibid.
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ness records in evidence, it would appear to be highly desirable to
urge the West Virginia legislature to enact into law the Uniform
Business Records as Evidence Act.
R.M.
CoPYwcGrrs:

A TmnvmNAm SKETCH

The Constitution of the United States provides that, "The
Congress shall have power... To promote the Progress of Science
and Useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries; .... 1 The two primary outgrowths of this provisionpatents and copyrights-being so closely bound together in the
Constitution, are often considered by the lawyer engaged in a
general practice as being beyond the ken of human understanding,
and to be avoided due to the complexity and special knowledge
required. This is correct as to patents, and the procuring of these
is best left to the specialist in that field. There is no reason, however, why the general practitioner of law cannot serve his clients
as to copyright matters in the normal course of business.
There is no common law copyright. Although an author has a
property right in his unpublished work, the copyright is purely a
statutory creature 2 and has repeatedly been held so since 1884.3
The first congressional action pursuant to the constitutional grant
was the Copyright Act of 1790,4 giving authors sole rights to publish
their books for a term of fourteen years. It was not until 1909,
however, that comprehensive legislation was enacted. 5 The present
copyright law6 is based on the Copyright Act of 1909, and, in general, follows it closely.
A copyright is defined as follows:
"An intangible, incorporeal right granted by statute to the
author or originator of certain literary or artistic productions,
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
Wheaton v. Peters, 38 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
4 1 STAT. 124 (1790).
r Copyright Law of 1909, 85 STAT. 1075 (1909).
661 STAT. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C.A. (Supp. 1957). The copyright law
was substantially reenacted in 61 STAT. 652. Hereafter, citation will be made
only to 17 U.S.C.A., in the interests of uniformity, unless the Statutes at Large
citation is other than 61 STAT. 652. U.S.C. and U.S.C.A. citations are identical
as to title and section (§) numbers; again, in the interest of uniformity, citation
will be made only to the annotated code, as most of the sections cited are correctly made thereto.
3
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